In the previous installment, we commenced an exploration of the theory of civilizations by examining the ideas of Carroll Quigley and Arnold Toynbee. Here, we will take a look at the writings of Sir John Glubb and Immanuel Wallerstein.
Sir John Glubb's The Fate of Empires and the Quest for Survival
A far shorter (than Quigley’s or Toynbee’s or Wallerstein’s) analysis is offered by Sir John Glubb (1897-1986), a second-generation English soldier and adventurer who ventured into the Arab world. His monograph bears the title The Fate of Empires and the Quest for Survival (1978).
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As an active figure in British imperialism, Glubb had a natural curiosity about the future of what he had fought for. Looking at 11 historical empires, he observed that the life of each great empire lasted about 250 years, or 10-12 generations. Assyria 859-612 BC; Persia 538-330 BC; Greece 331-100 BC; Roman Republic 260-27 BC; Roman Empire 27 BC-AD 180; Arab Empire 634-880 AD; Mamluk Empire 1250-1517; Ottoman Empire 1320-1570; Spain 1500-1750; Romanov Russia 1682-1916; Great Britain 1700-1950.
Before launching into his analysis, Glubb makes a few caveats. (1) He merely states the facts without trying to prove anything. (2) Looking at the facts, it is perhaps worth studying more deeply the life of civilizations. (3) The division of Rome into the Republican and Imperial periods may be controversial, but according to Glubb it is appropriate. (4) Not all empires lived out their entire quarter-millennium. (5) The longevity of empires is independent of epoch, geography and armaments. (6) It is tempting to draw a comparison between the lives of empires and the lives of men - childhood, youth, manhood, old age.
Glubb suggests that the one common measure among all civilizations is the obligatory component of any society - people. 10 generations pass in 250 years.
The phases of development of civilizations that Glubb suggests are: (1) The Age of Pioneers; (2) The Age of Conquest; (3) The Age of Commerce; (4) The Age of Affluence; (5) The Age of Intellect; (6) The Age of Decadence.
The first two epochs correspond closely to the periods of growth mentioned by Quigley and Toynbee, and the epochs of commerce and abundance recall the era of universal Empire. But it is interesting to see what this Age of Intelligence is about and what Glubb thinks about the mechanisms of the rise and fall of empires.
As for the mechanism of the rise, Glubb suggests the following. According to him, it is mainly small peripheral peoples who show incredible courage and energy in their thirst for the riches of the neighboring settled civilizations that “burst out”. This sounds like the cycles of shifting the center of gravity from the ossified core to the periphery within a civilization.
The Battle of Lepanto of 1571 (1640) by Andries van Eertvelt (1590–1652). Lepanto is where Westerners finally largely halted the expansion of one of the great peripheral tribal conquerors in history - the Turks.
V Characteristics of the outburst
These sudden outbursts are usually characterised by an extraordinary display of energy and courage. The new conquerors are normally poor, hardy and enterprising and above all aggressive. The decaying empires which they overthrow are wealthy but defensive-minded. ...
VI The causes of race outbursts
The modern instinct is to seek a reason for everything, and to doubt the veracity of a statement for which a reason cannot be found. So many examples can be given of the sudden eruption of an obscure race into a nation of conquerors that the truth of the phenomenon cannot be held to be doubtful. To assign a cause is more difficult. Perhaps the easiest explanation is to assume that the poor and obscure race is tempted by the wealth of the ancient civilisation, and there would undoubtedly appear to be an element of greed for loot in barbarian invasions.
Glubb points to the thirst for money that emerges in an already established empire as a mechanism for stagnation. Using Quigley's terminology, the instrument of growth becomes an institution for exploitation and rent. And referring to Toynbee's ideas, we can assume that the "inventive elite" throws its forces into the acquisition of personal gains, and not into the search for honors, which are already more difficult to achieve, because in the developed empire there are fewer opportunity for adventure and conquest (of any kind) than in the early empire.
The first half of the Age of Commerce appears to be peculiarly splendid. The ancient virtues of courage, patriotism and devotion to duty are still in evidence. The nation is proud, united and full of selfconfidence. Boys are still required, first of all, to be manly — to ride, to shoot straight and to tell the truth. (It is remarkable what emphasis is placed, at this stage, on the manly virtue of truthfulness, for lying is cowardice — the fear of facing up to the situation.)
Boys’ schools are intentionally rough. Frugal eating, hard living, breaking the ice to have a bath and similar customs are aimed at producing a strong, hardy and fearless breed of men. Duty is the word constantly drummed into the heads of young people.
The Age of Commerce is also marked by great enterprise in the exploration for new forms of wealth. Daring initiative is shown in the search for profitable enterprises in far corners of the earth, perpetuating to some degree the adventurous courage of the Age of Conquests.
There does not appear to be any doubt that money is the agent which causes the decline of this strong, brave and self-confident people. The decline in courage, enterprise and a sense of duty is, however, gradual.
The first direction in which wealth injures the nation is a moral one. Money replaces honour and adventure as the objective of the best young men. Moreover, men do not normally seek to make money for their country or their community, but for themselves. Gradually, and almost imperceptibly, the Age of Affluence silences the voice of duty. The object of the young and the ambitious is no longer fame, honour or service, but cash.
Education undergoes the same gradual transformation. No longer do schools aim at producing brave patriots ready to serve their country. Parents and students alike seek the educational qualifications which will command the highest salaries. The Arab moralist, Ghazali (1058-1111), complains in these very same words of the lowering of objectives in the declining Arab world of his time. Students, he says, no longer attend college to acquire learning and virtue, but to obtain those qualifications which will enable them to grow rich. The same situation is everywhere evident among us in the West today.
With affluence, the entire worldview of the population changes. The rich empire thinks more about how to protect its treasures than about plundering the already impoverished world around it. The well-to-do citizens do not want to risk their lives in random wars - their lives are too sweet, and things like honor and duty are for fools.
The age of intellect follows the age of affluence. Part of the wealth available to the empire goes into founding new universities, academies, etc.
The ambition of the young, once engaged in the pursuit of adventure and military glory, and then in the desire for the accumulation of wealth, now turns to the acquisition of academic honours.
In general, only spoiled bohemians and those who have been provided for since childhood can afford to live on the principle that money does not matter. The enrichment of their parents in the preceding age allows the children of the Age of Intellect (or Enlightenment) to indulge in philosophical and literary musings and contests. While it leads to some discoveries, this era also causes difficulties.
As in the case of the Athenians, intellectualism leads to discussion, debate and argument, such as is typical of the Western nations today. Debates in elected assemblies or local committees, in articles in the Press or in interviews on television — endless and incessant talking.
Men are interminably different, and intellectual arguments rarely lead to agreement. Thus public affairs drift from bad to worse, amid an unceasing cacophony of argument. But this constant dedication to discussion seems to destroy the power of action. Amid a Babel of talk, the ship drifts on to the rocks.
The rabid discussion culminates in a swath of ideologies that split society. Civil wars and the inability of united action follow.
As the citizens of the empire quarrel, millions of immigrants flood in from the barbarian world, hungry for a bite of the imperial bounty.
One of the oft-repeated phenomena of great empires is the influx of foreigners to the capital city. Roman historians often complain of the number of Asians and Africans in Rome. Baghdad, in its prime in the ninth century, was international in its population — Persians, Turks, Arabs, Armenians, Egyptians, Africans and Greeks mingled in its streets.
Many in our age would perk up at this point and ask: What is so bad about immigrants? Is not diversity our strength? Glubb replies as follows:
This problem does not consist in any inferiority of one race as compared with another, but simply in the differences between them. ... immigrants are liable to form communities of their own, protecting primarily their own interests, and only in the second degree that of the nation as a whole. ... While the empire is enjoying its High Noon of prosperity, all these people are proud and glad to be imperial citizens. But when decline sets in, it is extraordinary how the memory of ancient wars, perhaps centuries before, is suddenly revived, and local or provincial movements appear demanding secession or independence.
Immigrants usually flood the cities, while the indigenous people continue to predominate in the countryside. This phenomenon is very noticeable in the West in our time.
In the age of decay, pessimism and frivolity become normative, expressed in alcoholism and drug addiction, sports mania, sexual debauchery, etc.
The heroes of declining nations are always the same — the athlete, the singer or the actor. The word ‘celebrity’ today is used to designate a comedian or a football player, not a statesman, a general, or a literary genius.
Glubb offers examples from Arabic history (which he knew from his service in the Arab world) and Roman history (part of the education of men of his rank and era). A curious point is the role of women in the declining empire.
The works of the contemporary historians of Baghdad in the early tenth century are still available. They deeply deplored the degeneracy of the times in which they lived, emphasising particularly the indifference to religion, the increasing materialism and the laxity of sexual morals. They lamented also the corruption of the officials of the government and the fact that politicians always seemed to amass large fortunes while they were in office.
The historians commented bitterly on the extraordinary influence acquired by popular singers over young people, resulting in a decline in sexual morality. The ‘pop’ singers of Baghdad accompanied their erotic songs on the lute, an instrument resembling the modern guitar. In the second half of the tenth century, as a result, much obscene sexual language came increasingly into use, such as would not have been tolerated in an earlier age. Several khalifs issued orders banning ‘pop’ singers from the capital, but within a few years they always returned.
An increase in the influence of women in public life has often been associated with national decline. The later Romans complained that, although Rome ruled the world, women ruled Rome. In the tenth century, a similar tendency was observable in the Arab Empire, the women demanding admission to the professions hitherto monopolised by men. ‘What,’ wrote the contemporary historian, Ibn Bessam, ‘have the professions of clerk, tax-collector or preacher to do with women? These occupations have always been limited to men alone.’ Many women practised law, while others obtained posts as university professors. There was an agitation for the appointment of female judges, which, however, does not appear to have succeeded.
Soon after this period, government and public order collapsed, and foreign invaders overran the country. The resulting increase in confusion and violence made it unsafe for women to move unescorted in the streets, with the result that this feminist movement collapsed.
Glubb, among other things, rejects any ideas of divinely chosen races and supreme ideologies, noting that all nations and all ideologies have had their moment in the sun. It is not ideologies but values such as valor, ingenuity and hunger for honors that lead to imperial triumphs.
Ming dynasty miniature of a Mongol horse archer. In the 13th-14th centuries, the Mongols built one of the great historical empires. By the 19th century, they were a backward people of no consequence on the world stage.
Cosmopolitanism and the welfare state are two other signs of a declining empire. Towards the end, the empire generously gives away to the entire world the citizenship that previous generations had proudly kept to themselves. And all newly minted citizens hunger for slices of the imperial pie.
We can end this section with Glubb's well-formed conclusion:
XXXIX Summary
As numerous points of interest have arisen in the course of this essay, I close with a brief summary, to refresh the reader’s mind.
(a) We do not learn from history because our studies are brief and prejudiced.
(b) In a surprising manner, 250 years emerges as the average length of national greatness.
(c) This average has not varied for 3,000 years. Does it represent ten generations?
(d) The stages of the rise and fall of great nations seem to be:
The Age of Pioneers (outburst)
The Age of Conquests
The Age of Commerce
The Age of Affluence
The Age of Intellect
The Age of Decadence.
(e) Decadence is marked by:
Defensiveness
Pessimism
Materialism
Frivolity
An influx of foreigners
The Welfare State
A weakening of religion.
(f) Decadence is due to:
Too long a period of wealth and power
Selfishness
Love of money
The loss of a sense of duty.
(g) The life histories of great states are amazingly similar, and are due to internal factors.
(h) Their falls are diverse, because they are largely the result of external causes.
(i) History should be taught as the history of the human race, though of course with emphasis on the history of the student’s own country.
Another interesting and valuable analysis of the large-scale historical processes of the last five centuries is contained in the works of the circle represented among others by the renowned American historian-sociologist Immanuel Wallerstein (1930-2019).
Wallerstein calls his general approach "world-system analysis." The idea is that human populations exist within "systems" that lend themselves to the techniques and principles of systems analysis. For example, systems tend toward states of equilibrium. When a system is stable and in a state of equilibrium, it is able to overcome significant shocks, and although a person has free will, in some sense the life of each individual is highly dependent on his place in the system. But when the system is in an unstable state, it becomes vulnerable and can be pushed to another state of equilibrium or even destroyed by a shock of sufficient power.
According to Wallerstein (and largely in agreement with Quigley), the capitalist system was formed around the 16th century (the "long 16th century" from about 1492 to the Peace of Westphalia in 1648 or the English Revolution of 1640). Wallerstein delves into detail about the nature of the capitalist system. The topic is interesting, but not essential within the framework of our overview. In short, according to Wallerstein, by the early 21-st century, the capitalist system has exhausted itself.
Specifically, in the last chapter of the book, Wallerstein writes the following:
Capitalist civilization has been elaborated within contradictions. This is not unusual; all historical systems have contradictions. In the case of historical capitalism, there are three principal contradictions, which I have tried to describe briefly. Each contradiction has been historically contained by adjustment mechanisms. But in each case these adjustment mechanisms have become strained. We may say that the cumulation of these strains means that the modern world-system as such is approaching, is probably already in, a systemic crisis.
A systemic crisis may be described as a situation in which the system has reached a bifurcation point, or the first of successive bifurcation points. When systems come to be far from points of equilibrium, they reach bifurcation points, wherein multiple, as opposed to unique, solutions to instability become possible. The system has at that point what we may think of as choice between possibilities. The choice depends both on the history of the system and the immediate strength of elements external to the internal logic of the system. These external elements are what we call ‘noise’ in terms of the system. When systems are functioning normally, ‘noise’ is ignored. But in situations far from equilibrium, the random variations in the ‘noise’ have a magnified effect because of the high increase in the disequilibrium. Thereupon, the system, now acting chaotically, will reconstruct itself quite radically in ways that are internally unpredictable, but which lead nonetheless to new forms of order. There can be, there usually is, under such conditions, not one but a cascade of bifurcations until a new system, that is, a new structure of long-term relative equilibrium, is established and once again we find ourselves in a situation of deterministic stability. The new emergent system is probably more complex; it is in any case different from the old system.
If we apply this general schema which applies to all systems—from physico-chemical to biological to social systems—to our immediate concern, i.e., the future prospects of capitalist civilization, we can summarize the situation as follows. The capitalist world-economy is a historical system that has been relatively stable, that is, operating within the logic of certain rules for some 500 years now. We have tried to evaluate its balance sheet, and then to indicate the strains on the processes of adjustment necessary to maintain its equilibrium. We have suggested the reasons why it is reaching or has reached bifurcation points. We seem to be in the midst of a process of cascading bifurcations that may last some 50 more years. We can be sure some new historical order will emerge. We cannot be sure what that order will be.
I will emphasize two ideas here, to which we will return later. The first is that deeds are especially important in times of crisis and chaos like ours. This is what Wallerstein means when he says that "in situations far from equilibrium, the random variations in the ‘noise’ have a magnified effect".
Conquest of Mexico by Cortés (17th century) by an unknown author. Cortes destroyed the unpopular and bloodthirsty Aztec empire with just a few hundred brave, trained, educated (at least an important few) and well-equipped men.
The other important idea is that to a significant extent, we build our own future. Wallerstein says that: "We can be sure some new historical order will emerge. We cannot be sure what that order will be." We cannot be sure because the new order will be the synthesis of viable systems that will be born out of the chaos and destruction of the collapsing world system in the coming decades. These viable systems and organisms will be the fruits of societies and peoples that manage to organize themselves in ways that reflects the current technological reality and its interactions with human consciousness. There will be such societies and peoples, and depending on the quality of their organization and principles, they will be able to secure some spheres of influence within which to develop.
I.e. - we have free will; every little decision and action of ours will be of particular importance in this period of change; and more than ever, it is up to us what kind of world we will create for our old age and for our children.
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